This paper develops a theory of umbrella branding as a way to link the reputations of otherwise unrelated products. The analysis predicts that umbrella branding can credibly signal positive correlation between the qualities of the included products to consumers, but cannot certify high quality or signal negative quality correlation. Moreover, whenever umbrella branding signals perfect positive quality correlation, …rms that already sell a high (low) quality product have stronger (weaker) incentives to invest in developing another high quality product than new entrants.
Introduction
Umbrella branding is one of the terms used to describe the common practice of selling several products under the same brand name. 1 Some umbrella brands sell related products, e.g., Sony sells ‡at screen televisions, ‡at screen monitors, and laptop computers. Others sell products in unrelated categories, e.g., Virgin sells music disks, air travel, cola drinks, and …nancial services.
A commonly advanced rationale for umbrella branding is that it allows …rms to leverage the reputation attached to a brand name (Kapferer 1997; Aaker 2004 ). Umbrella branding helps …rms with strong brands to successfully introduce new products by convincing consumers that new and existing products are of similar quality. Empirical and experimental studies con…rm that consumers' quality perceptions of a product are correlated with their evaluations of other products sold under the same umbrella brand. Using scanner panel data of toothpaste and toothbrush sales, Erdem (1998) estimates a correlation between consumers'prior quality perceptions of two umbrella branded products of 0:88. 2 Sullivan (1990) …nds that an alleged sudden-acceleration defect of the Audi 4000 model had signi…cant negative e¤ects on the demands for other models sold under the Audi brand.
In a secondary analysis of eight experimental datasets including the one in Aaker and Keller's (1990) seminal study on the question, Bottomley and Holden (2001) …nd that the perceived quality of the parent brand has a signi…cant e¤ect on how consumers evaluate a brand extension.
One potential explanation for correlated perceptions is that a …rm's skill level or other key inputs determine the quality of all products it manufactures and umbrella branding informs consumers that products originate from the same manufacturer. An alternative explanation, which will be the focus of this paper, is that …rms have incentives to only employ umbrella brands for products that are similar in terms of quality. Correlation hence arises endogenously as a result of …rms' branding decisions.
Endogenous quality correlation is relevant because technological quality correlation due to the use of a common input seems unrealistic in many situations. First, some umbrella branded products are manufactured by di¤erent …rms. 3 The AT&T brand for example used to be licensed to VTech for telephone sets and to Verbatim for blank media. Second, there are many brands that have been 1 Other terms include brand extensions and brand stretching. 2 Using the same dataset, Erdem and Winer (1999) …nd further evidence of inter-category correlation of (multiple) attribute-perceptions for umbrella brands, while Erdem and Sun (2002) show that advertising has an uncertaintyreducing role across categories for umbrella brands. 3 Short of being manufactured by di¤erent …rms, some umbrella branded products are manufactured in di¤erent factories located in di¤erent countries. Many piano brands for instance manufacture their cheaper models in China, while their higher-end models are manufactured in Japan.
extended into distant product categories (see Klink and Smith 2001) , and evidence from marketing suggests that even in such situations consumers tend to perceive quality links between umbrella branded products (see Swaminathan, Fox, and Reddy 2001; Bottomley and Holden 2001) . Third, even products in related categories that are manufactured by the same …rm do not always have similar product features and qualities. Only automatic cars can experience sudden acceleration, for example, but after the Audi incident mentioned above negative feedback e¤ects also caused a signi…cant fall in demand for the Audi Quattro that was only available with standard transmission (see Sullivan 1990 ). Fourth and maybe most importantly, while some …rms may simply lack the skills to develop and produce high-quality products, …rms that possess the required skills are usually also able to produce low quality and can save costs by doing so. Hence, skill alone is insu¢ cient to explain why products manufactured by the same …rm should share the same high quality. This paper analyzes whether and when umbrella branding can convince rational consumers that products are likely to be of similar or identical quality, even in the absence of technological quality correlation. The model is based on an information asymmetry between …rms and consumers. Firms know the qualities of their products, whereas consumers learn about quality over time through observations of product performance, which are imperfect signals of quality. Product qualities are either exogenously given or determined by …rms'pre-launch investments in product development.
Since …rms can condition their branding decisions on qualities, umbrella branding can convey information to consumers even in the absence of any technological quality correlation. First, the umbrella branding decision itself may in ‡uence consumers'beliefs about qualities; umbrella branding has signaling e¤ects in this case. Second, umbrella branding leads to feedback e¤ects whenever consumers believe that the qualities of the included products are correlated. In the case of positive quality correlation, the success (failure) of an umbrella branded product has a positive (negative) feedback e¤ect on consumers'belief about the quality of the other product sold under the same brand (for evidence of such feedback e¤ects, see Sullivan 1990; John, Loken and Joiner 1998) . I analyze the interplay of these e¤ects in a two-stage game with two products sold either under separate brands or under an umbrella brand in both periods. This paper's central result is that positive quality correlation can arise endogenously in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In particular, for some parameter values there are equilibria in which umbrella brands always o¤er products of uniform quality. In the equilibria of this type characterized in the paper, the signaling e¤ects are such that …rms of any quality pro…le could make a short term gain by using an umbrella brand; the expected long term impact of the branding decision, however, depends on actual qualities. For …rms with one good and one bad product, umbrella branding means putting the future reputation of the good product at stake by inviting consumers to pool their experiences.
If future pro…ts are important, these …rms will therefore prefer separate branding. For …rms with two bad products, on the other hand, the branding decision's expected long term impact can be negligible: if the consumption of a bad product is su¢ ciently likely to convince consumers of this product's low quality, then bad products can be expected to lose their reputations in the long term regardless of the branding decision. Umbrella branding will then be attractive for …rms with only bad products, since it allows them to reap short term pro…t gains without incurring any signi…cant long term losses. Finally, for …rms with two good products, umbrella branding is attractive not only in the short but also in the long term: thanks to positive feedback e¤ects, these …rms expect to consolidate their products'reputations faster under umbrella than under separate branding.
In contrast, there are no equilibria in which successes (failures) have negative (positive) feedback e¤ects. If consumers expected the qualities of umbrella branded products to be negatively correlated, then …rms with two bad products would bene…t from positive feedback e¤ects with a higher likelihood than …rms with one or two good products. Moreover, the outside option of separate branding is always less pro…table for …rms with two bad products than for any other …rm. These arguments imply that umbrella branding would be particularly attractive for …rms with only bad products. Anticipating this, however, consumers'willingness to pay for umbrella branded products would be low. This in turn would render umbrella branding unpro…table for all …rms.
The analysis yields several testable implications regarding the circumstances under which umbrella branding is likely to be pro…table (absent direct cost considerations) and induce positively correlated beliefs. 4 First, the prior reputation of the seller's existing product must be high enough.
This implies that one would only expect the brands of su¢ ciently popular products to be successfully extended. Second, the markets for the two products need to be su¢ ciently symmetric in terms of
size. An extension from a mass product to a niche product (or vice versa) cannot be an informative signal about qualities. Third, the seller must attach su¢ cient weight to both short term and long term pro…ts from both products. Fourth, consumers must be su¢ ciently uncertain about the qualities of both products at the time of the brand extension. If consumers are already certain about the quality of the …rm's existing product, umbrella branding cannot a¤ect beliefs because the old product's reputation can no longer be put at stake.
The second main result of the paper is that umbrella branding a¤ects sellers'incentives to invest in the quality of new products. Consider a model extension in which producers of new goods choose their products'qualities prior to selling. Choosing high quality is associated with a …xed investment cost, privately drawn by each producer from a commonly known probability distribution. In this framework, equilibria in which umbrella branding signals perfect quality correlation continue to exist for suitable parameter values and all share the following feature. Investing in the new product's quality is more attractive for …rms with a good existing product, available for an umbrella brand, than for mono-product …rms: selling a good new product is more pro…table if you can umbrella brand it with a good existing product and thereby bene…t (in expectation) from positive feedback e¤ects in both directions. Firms that already sell a product of low quality have the lowest investment incentive. The option to use an umbrella brand hence strengthens the quality investment incentives of …rms that already sell a high quality product, but weakens the quality investment incentives of …rms that currently sell a low quality product.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes the framework. Section 4 presents the main e¤ects of umbrella branding on beliefs and pro…ts; in particular, it explains the relationship between the branding strategy, the correlation of consumers' prior quality perceptions, and signaling and feedback e¤ects. Section 5 contains my main results about the (in)existence of di¤erent types of equilibria. Section 6 extends the basic model in two directions. First, by endogenizing the quality of new products, and second, by introducing the possibility that the …rm cannot observe the quality of its new product. Section 8 contains concluding remarks. All proofs are in the appendix.
Related Literature
There are two main approaches to modeling umbrella branding, and more generally reputation.
Either reputation refers to a …rm's or a product's characteristics (adverse selection), or to its actions (moral hazard). 5 Brand names are important as carriers of information in this context. 6 Existing theoretical analyses of umbrella branding focus on umbrella branding as a signal of high quality. Wernerfelt (1988) considers an adverse selection model that allows for endogenous quality 5 Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982) are seminal articles on the adverse selection approach. The basic framework of the moral hazard approach goes back to Klein and Le-er (1981) and Shapiro (1983) . Mailath and Samuelson (2006) as well as Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) present a variety of recent reputation models, some of which combine aspects of moral hazard and adverse selection. 6 Name trading between …rms has been modelled by Kreps (1990) in a moral hazard context, and by Tadelis (1999) in an adverse selection model that shares several key features with my approach.
correlation between umbrella branded products while treating quality as exogenous, as in this paper.
He establishes conditions for an equilibrium in which umbrella brands sell only high quality products that never fail. This outcome is sustained by pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs following failures of umbrella branded products, which under some additional conditions are the only beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Wernerfelt's results hinge upon the assumptions that (i) high quality products never fail, and (ii) umbrella branding is more costly than the introduction of a new brand. 7 Choi (1998) derives a similar "quality certi…cation" result in a moral hazard context. 8 In an
in…nite horizon model where a …rm discovers a new product of given quality in every period, he …nds conditions for an equilibrium in which "premium" umbrella brands only extend to high quality goods. This equilibrium is sustained by the threat of a breakdown of trust if consumers ever observe that a bad product was introduced under a premium brand.
The present paper uses a …nite horizon approach to avoid problems common to repeated-game models of reputation, in particular the high required degree of coordination between …rms and consumers, and the absence of predictions concerning the evolution of reputation over time. Moreover, in contrast to Wernerfelt (1988) , the analysis does not rely on the assumptions that umbrella branding is costly and that failures are perfect signals of low quality. This new modeling approach leads to an important shift of focus in terms of results: while umbrella brands are guarantees of high quality in the literature described so far, my model stresses the role of umbrella brands as signals of quality correlation. Since consumers continue to learn about quality after the branding decision, the performance of one product can have feedback e¤ects on buyers'perception of the other product's quality on the equilibrium path. The model hence overcomes the discrepancy between the theoretical prediction of Wernerfelt (1988) and Choi (1998) that umbrella branded products never disappoint buyers and the empirical and experimental evidence that umbrella brands induce a positive correlation between quality perceptions without guaranteeing high quality (Aaker and Keller 1990; Erdem 1998; John, Locken and Joiner 1998; Swaminathan, Fox and Reddy 2001). In an empirical study of toothpaste and toothbrush umbrella brands, for instance, Erdem (1998) …nds that consumers remain uncertain about quality (cavity-…ghting ability) even after repeated consumption and that "...though 7 Another adverse selection model in which umbrella branding guarantees high quality is Hakenes and Peitz (2009), which compares umbrella branding with external quality certi…cation. Moorthy (2010) discusses the robustness of Wernerfelt's (1988) results, in particular with respect to the assumption that umbrella branding is more costly than separate branding, and proposes alternative o¤-equilibrium beliefs. 8 In fact, his model features both adverse selection and moral hazard aspects; the branding problem itself, however, is subject to a moral hazard problem.
consumers perceive quality levels of umbrella brands as correlated across product categories, which makes it easier for strong umbrella brands to introduce new products, umbrella branding is not a guarantee for successful extensions." Cabral (2000) proposes an alternative theory of umbrella branding that features ongoing learning and feedback e¤ects (from new on old products, but not vice versa). 9 Building on the premise that the qualities of umbrella branded products are identical for exogenous reasons, he shows that higher quality sellers have stronger incentives to extend their brands. My paper is complementary to Cabral (2000 Rasmusen (2010) . The key insight of that literature is that umbrella branding can expand the scope for quality provision when …rms simultaneously choose both products'qualities. 10 My analysis of quality provision is di¤erent: the existing product's quality is given by past decisions, and the prediction is that umbrella branding strengthens the incentives to invest in the quality of the new product only if the exiting product is already of high quality. To the best of my knowledge, this is the …rst paper to identify a link between …rms' incentives to invest in the qualities of new products and the qualities of their existing products.
Other functions of umbrella branding in the literature are the reduction of uncertainty, either about horizontal product characteristics (Sappington and Wernerfelt 1985) or about quality (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1992), and the exploitation of the intrinsic value (status or otherwise) of a brand (Pepall and Richards 2002) . Rotemberg (2010) analyzes umbrella branding when …rms are concerned with being perceived as altruistic towards customers. 9 In my model, there are feedback e¤ects in both directions. This is necessary to derive endogenous quality correlation. 10 In Andersson (2002), Cabral (2009) , and Rasmusen (2010) , the basic mechanism ressembles that in Bernheim and Whinston (1990)'s analysis of collusion under multimarket contact. Hakenes and Peitz (2008) , using the assumption that high quality products never fail, rely on pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs following the failure of one or both umbrella branded products.
Framework
I consider a two-period model. At the beginning of period t = 1, a …xed measure of …rms, each endowed with one "new" product, is born. In addition, there is a …xed measure of incumbent …rms in the economy, each selling one "old" product. One of these incumbents also gets endowed with a new product at the beginning of period t = 1. 11 The focus of the analysis will be the branding decision of this multi-product …rm. 12 Following the branding decision, all products are sold in periods t = 1 and t = 2.
All products are experience goods, each of either good or bad quality. Only …rms observe the qualities of their products. Quality determines the relative probabilities of the two possible performance outcomes, success (S) and failure (F ). A good product generates a success, i.e. works well, with probability g 2 (0; 1), while a bad product is successful with a lower probability b 2 (0; g). Conditional on quality, performances are distributed i.i.d. across periods. In each period, all consumers observe the same product performance, i.e., performance is batch or product generation speci…c.
Consumers'prior belief about the quality of new products is r n 2 (0; 1). At the beginning of period t = 1, consumers hence assign probability r n to any new product being good.
The old product of the multi-product …rm, henceforth also simply referred to as "the …rm", has reputation r o 2 (0; 1) at the beginning of period t = 1. 13 The …rm's strategy consists of whether or not to extend its existing brand to its new product, given the qualities q o 2 fb; gg and q n 2 fb; gg of its old and its new product, respectively. Formally, x qoqn 2 [0; 1] will denote the probability that the …rm chooses an umbrella brand if the product qualities are q o and q n . The …rm's umbrella branding strategy is hence a vector (x gg ; x gb ; x bg ; x bb ) that gives the probability of a brand extension for every possible quality pro…le (q o ; q n ). The analysis will allow for mixed strategies, i.e., x qoqn 2 (0; 1), unless explicitly mentioned otherwise.
Following Tadelis (1999) and Cabral (2000) , I assume that consumers do not observe the ownership of each brand. This means that consumers connect two products to the same …rm if and only if the …rm uses an umbrella brand. If the …rm decides to introduce its new product under a separate 11 The analysis would be unchanged if instead of just one incumbent, a countable (i.e., measure zero) set of incumbents were endowed with a second product. The results would also continue to hold if each incumbent …rm were endowed with a new product with a strictly positive but su¢ ciently small probability. 12 The analysis would be the same if instead of being endowed with a second product, an incumbent got randomly matched with an entrant to negotiate a brand licensing agreement (assuming the …rms can observe each other's qualities). 13 The reputations of other old products at the beginning of period t = 1 can be di¤erent from r o . Since past performances determine the beliefs about old products, it would be inapproriate to impose that consumers hold the same beliefs about all old products.
TABLE 1
Timing t = 1 The firm is endowed with a new product of quality q n and extends its brand with probability x q o q n .
Consumers observe brand names and buy one unit of each product.
Consumers observe performances a o and a n . t = 2 Consumers buy one unit of each product.
brand, consumers are unaware that the …rm decided against an umbrella brand. This assumption is appropriate for fast moving consumer goods, where …rms that have several brands often try to "hide" from consumers that these brands belong to the same …rm and consumers are unlikely to expend e¤ort to track products back to their producers. In my framework, this assumption implies that the absence of an umbrella brand does not lead consumers to revise their initial beliefs r n and r o .
Consumers'information set prior to consumption in period 1 thus includes the observation that a …rm uses an umbrella brand if that is the case and nothing otherwise. Prior to period 2 consumption decisions, consumers update their beliefs based on the product performances in period 1. The period 1 performances of the two products sold by the multi-product incumbent whose strategy I consider will be denoted by o 2 fF; Sg and n 2 fF; Sg. Table 1 summarizes the timing.
All consumers have unit demands for all products, and the consumption of a well-functioning product procures a utility of one while consumption of a failing product procures zero utility. A consumer's willingness to pay for a product with reputation is thus
In every period, the …rms make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to consumers and therefore optimally set each product's price equal to consumers'willingness to pay for that product. 14 Production costs are zero.
Firms attach weight 2 (0; 1) to second period pro…ts. Moreover, the markets for the di¤erent products that the multi-product …rm sells can be asymmetric. The share of the market for the new product in the …rm's total sales is denoted by 2 (0; 1). Normalizing the total number of units that the multi-product …rms sells in the two periods to one, consumers then buy (1 )(1 ) units of its old product in period 1, (1 ) units of its new product in period 1, (1 ) units of its old product in period 2, and units of its new product in period 2.
The analysis will focus on equilibria in which the …rm uses umbrella branding with positive probability, i.e., x qo;qn > 0 for some (q o ; q n ). 15 Since g; b 2 (0; 1), such equilibria do not contain any o¤-equilibrium beliefs. A (Bayesian) equilibrium consists of a belief system and an umbrella branding strategy (x gg ; x gb ; x bg ; x bb ) such that (i) the branding strategy maximizes the …rm's expected pro…ts given beliefs, and (ii) beliefs are Bayesian consistent given the branding strategy.
Signaling and feedback e¤ects 4.1 The impact of umbrella branding on beliefs
Umbrella branding can induce two types of e¤ects on beliefs. First, the decision to umbrella brand on its own may be a quality signal. For the new product, for example, such a signaling e¤ect occurs whenever consumers believe that a new product introduced under an umbrella brand is either more or less likely to be of high quality than new products carrying unknown brand names. These signaling e¤ects are relevant both for …rst and second period beliefs.
Second, umbrella branding leads feedback e¤ects whenever consumers believe that the qualities of umbrella branded products are correlated. The success or failure of one product, say the new product, then induces consumers to revise their beliefs not only about the new product itself but also about the old product. Since these feedback e¤ects are linked to performance observations that occur at the end of period one, they are only relevant for the analysis of second period beliefs.
Period 1 As explained in the previous section, if the …rm uses separate brands then consumers do not revise their priors r o and r n about the qualities of the multi-product …rm's products at the beginning of the …rst period. Confronted with an umbrella brand, however, consumers possibly revise their beliefs about both products'qualities at the beginning of period one already. Whenever brand extensions happen with positive probability in equilibrium, all beliefs can be obtained by Bayesian updating. I denote by qoqn the probability consumers assign to the quality pro…le (q o ; q n ) if they observe an umbrella brand; for example:
To simplify notations, let me denote the aggregate belief that the old product of the umbrella brand is good by
and the belief that the new product is good by
Umbrella branding has a positive signaling e¤ect on the new product if and only if it improves the consumers'belief about the quality of the new product, i.e., whenever
This condition is satis…ed whenever, given the prior r o about the quality of the old product, a brand extension is more likely to involve a good rather than a bad new product:
Similarly, the signaling e¤ect on the core product is positive if and only if
which holds whenever given r n a brand extension is more likely to involve a good rather than a bad 16 The probabilities consumers assign to the quality pro…les other than (g; g) are
old product:
Whenever consumers remain uncertain about both products'qualities, i.e., o ; n 2 (0; 1), …rst period beliefs can be used to calculate a measure of the perceived correlation between q o and q n under umbrella branding. 17 Since q o and q n are binary variables, the appropriate correlation measure is the Phi coe¢ cient developed by Yule (1912) . The following table summarizes the probabilities that consumers assign to di¤erent realizations of q o and q n if the …rm chooses umbrella branding:
Using the information in this table, the Phi correlation coe¢ cient can be computed as
which using the previously derived expressions for Bayesian consistent beliefs can be re-expressed in terms of prior beliefs and the branding strategy:
If > 0 ( < 0), then consumers perceive q o and q n as positively (negatively) correlated whenever the seller uses an umbrella brand. Since consumers hold Bayesian consistent beliefs, I will also refer to an equilibrium in which > 0 ( < 0) as an equilibrium with "positive quality correlation"
("negative quality correlation").
From (6) it is apparent that > 0 if and only if
17 Statistical correlation is only de…ned for random variables, which in the present context means that umbrella branding must not fully reveal the quality of one or both products to consumers (0 < o ; n < 1). Hence, the correlation coe¢ cient derived in (5) below is not well-de…ned in an equilibrium with gg = o = n = 1 as in Wernerfelt (1988) . Note also that a priori an equilibrium with gg = 1 can be the limit of a sequence of equilibria with either a positive, a zero, or a negative correlation coe¢ cient . Proposition 1 in Section 5.1 shows that no equilibrium with gg = 1 exists.
Perfect positive correlation ( = 1) obtains for any branding strategy such that x gb = x bg = 0 but x gg ; x bb > 0. Perfect negative correlation ( = 1) obtains for any branding strategy such that umbrella branding always involves products of opposite qualities, i.e., x gg = x bb = 0 but x gb ; x bg > 0.
At this point it is useful to note that knowledge of or the branding strategy alone is insu¢ cient to assess whether the signaling e¤ects are positive. For the perfect quality correlation branding strategy (x gg ; x gb ; x bg ; x bb ) = (1; 0; 0; 1) for instance, the signaling e¤ect on the old product is positive if and only if the prior of the new product r n > 1 2 (see (4) (see (2)). Since what umbrella branding does is essentially to reveal that q o = q n , umbrella branding is good news about q o whenever a priori consumers believe that the new product is more likely to be good than bad
, then revelation of the fact that q n = q o is good news about q n . Hence, although the branding strategy (1; 0; 0; 1) is "neutral" between good and bad products in the sense that the (g; g)-type and the (b; b)-type brand equally, umbrella branding has two positive signaling e¤ects if both priors are su¢ ciently optimistic.
Period 2 After period 1 consumption, consumers observe the performances of both products.
They then update their beliefs so as to take into account these additional pieces of information in the second period.
Under separate branding, the updating of beliefs is "standard" in the sense that consumers only take into account each product's own performance. If the old product succeeds in the …rst period, for example, consumers update their belief that the old product is of high quality from r o to
Similarly, if the new product fails, consumers revise their belief that it is of high quality from r n to
.
The updated belief after a failure of the old product is then F (r o ), and the updated belief following a success of the new product is S (r n ).
Under umbrella branding, consumers update their period 1 beliefs o and n not only taking into account each product's own performance, but possibly also the brand's overall performance. Consider consumers' belief about the old product after a success of this product for example. If consumers ignored the new product's performance, then their second period belief would simply be S ( o ).
Now suppose that the new product was successful, too, and that consumers use this additional information. In that case, the belief consumers hold about the old product "before" taking account of the old product's own performance, is no longer
The "…nal" belief consumers assign to the core product being good if both products were successful in the …rst period is then simply
The success of the new product has a positive feedback e¤ect on the old product if and only if
The beliefs consumers hold about the quality of the new product, or after observing di¤erent performance outcomes, can be obtained using the same hypothetical two-step procedure. First, the observation of product i's performance i has a feedback e¤ect on the belief about product i's quality (i 6 = i), captured by the revision from i to i i . 18 Second, consumers update their belief to take into account product i's own performance i , which amounts to a revision from
The following table summarizes second period beliefs as a function of the pieces of information (umbrella versus separate branding, and the products'performances) consumers have: 18 In the cases ignored so far, the beliefs after the …rst step of the revision are
After any realization of performances, the e¤ect of umbrella branding on the second period belief about each product can then be decomposed into two e¤ects. Following two successes, for example, the impact of umbrella branding on the old product's reputation is
The …rst term between brackets is positive if and only if the success of the new product has a positive feedback e¤ect on the old product. The second term is positive if and only if umbrella branding has a positive signaling e¤ect on the old product.
Quality Correlation and Feedback E¤ects
Whether successes/failures of umbrella branded products have positive or negative feedback e¤ects depends on the sign of , the measure of the perceived correlation between product qualities derived in (5). For any i 2 fo; ng:
If consumers perceive the qualities of umbrella branded products to be positively correlated ( > 0), then successes have positive feedback e¤ects. Conversely, if < 0, then the success of any one of the products has a negative feedback e¤ect on the other product's reputation.
The impact of umbrella branding on pro…ts
Given beliefs, one can analyze the …rm's incentive to use an umbrella brand by considering the marginal impact of umbrella branding on expected aggregate pro…ts. I denote by 1 the di¤erence between the …rst period pro…ts under umbrella branding and under separate branding:
Similarly, 2 ( o ; n ) denotes the (ex post) di¤erence in second period pro…ts between umbrella and separate branding, following the performance pro…le ( o ; n ):
For example,
Finally, (q o ; q n ) denotes the total di¤erence in expected pro…ts between umbrella and separate branding, which is equal to the weighted sum of the …rst period and expected second period pro…t di¤erences:
where
The branding strategy (x gg ; x gb ; x bg ; x bb ) is optimal if and only if for all (q o ; q n ):
The Pro…t Impact of Signaling and Feedback E¤ects To illustrate the impact of the signaling and feedback e¤ects on pro…ts, note …rst that in
short run price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the old product
short run price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the new product ; the …rst term is positive if and only if the signaling e¤ect on the core product is positive, and the second term is positive if and only if the signaling e¤ect on the extension product is positive.
The expected second period pro…t di¤erence can be decomposed as follows:
expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on the old product
expected long term price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the old product
expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on the new product
expected long term price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the new product Since S ( ) and F ( ) are both increasing, the "expected long term price impact of the signaling e¤ect on the old product" is positive if and only if o > r o . Similarly, for the new product, the expected long term price impact of the signaling e¤ect is positive if and only if n > r n . The signs of these e¤ects are hence independent of quality; their magnitudes, however, generally vary with quality.
As already discussed in the section on beliefs, given the sign of the correlation coe¢ cient , it is easy to assess the signs of the two feedback e¤ects ex post. For > 0, for example, a success of the extension product has a positive feedback e¤ect on the (price of the) core product. The following lemma shows that knowledge of the quality of product i is su¢ cient to also assess the "expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on product i":
Lemma 1
For > 0, the expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on product i 2 fo; ng is positive if and only if product i 6 = i is good. Formally, for any q o 2 fb; gg:
and for any q n 2 fb; gg:
For < 0, the expected price impact of the feedback e¤ect on product i 2 fo; ng is positive if and only if product i 6 = i is bad.
In some instances, Lemma 1 will prove helpful in evaluating the total impact of umbrella branding on pro…ts: for instance Lemma 1 implies that if > 0 and both signaling e¤ects are non-negative, then (g; g) > 0.
Equilibria

Equilibria without feedback e¤ects
There are potentially two kinds of equilibria without feedback e¤ects: (i) equilibria in which umbrella branding allows consumers to fully infer the quality of one or both products, and (ii) 'babbling' equilibria in which umbrella branding happens but has no impact whatsoever on beliefs and prices.
Suppose that umbrella branding convinces consumers that both products are good. Then the …rm earns an expected pro…t of w(1) if it chooses umbrella branding, independently of the true quality pro…le (q o ; q n ). The expected pro…t under separate branding, on the other hand, is lowest for the (b; b)-type and highest for the (g; g)-type. Hence, the bene…t from umbrella branding is greatest for a …rm with two bad products, which therefore cannot be kept from umbrella branding. As a result, there is no equilibrium in which umbrella branding signals that both products are good. By the same reasoning, umbrella branding cannot guarantee the high quality of only one of the two products either. The following proposition summarizes this discussion (a formal proof can be found in the appendix):
Proposition 1 There does not exist any equilibrium in which umbrella branding fully reveals the high quality of the old and/or the new product.
The result in Proposition 1 relies on the assumption that good products can fail (possibly with a very small probability), so that consumers who are convinced that a product is good do not revise their beliefs downwards even after observing a failure. If g were equal to 1, then an equilibrium in which umbrella branding guarantees high quality could be sustained by specifying su¢ ciently pessimistic o¤-equilibrium beliefs following the failure of an umbrella branded product (see Wernerfelt 1988;
Hakenes and Peitz 2008; Moorthy 2010).
Babbling equilibria, on the other hand, always exist. If x qoqn = 1 for all (q o ; q n ), then umbrella branding does not a¤ect beliefs. This in turn implies that the …rm is indi¤erent between umbrella branding and separate branding, so the strategy is indeed optimal. The following proposition provides a number of structural conditions under which only babbling equilibria exist:
Proposition 2 Any equilibrium is a babbling equilibrium if -ceteris paribus -one of the following conditions is satis…ed:
i) The markets for the old and for the new product are too asymmetric, i.e., is too close to 0 or 1:
ii) The consumers'prior about one of the products is already very accurate, i.e., r o is too close to 1 or 0, or r n is too close to 1 or 0.
iii) Firms are too impatient, i.e., is too close to 0.
iv) Quality di¤erences are too small, i.e., b is too close to g.
For umbrella branding to a¤ect beliefs, the …rm's branding incentives must depend on its quality
pro…le. This requires that pro…ts are su¢ ciently responsive to the performances of both products. A prerequisite for this is of course that beliefs are su¢ ciently responsive to performances. It is easy to see why this cannot be the case in the last two situations treated in the proposition. For b too close to g, beliefs hardly respond to performance observations. If is too close to 0, then intertemporal pro…ts are not at all responsive to performances, as future pro…ts do not receive any weight.
If consumers are already very well-informed about the quality of one of the products (case ii)), then (i) umbrella branding hardly a¤ects the price of this product in either the short or the long run, and (ii) beliefs hardly respond to this product's performance. 19 This means that the signaling e¤ect on the other product will drive the branding decision. Since the sign of that e¤ect is the same for all quality pro…les, however, there is no way to induce some …rm types to umbrella brand with a higher probability than other …rm types, which would be necessary to create a signaling e¤ect in the …rst place. Smith and Park (1992) provide evidence consistent with result ii) of Proposition 2 in a study based on survey data about a large range of consumer products. They …nd that the better consumers'knowledge of the new product the weaker are the e¤ects of brand extensions.
Finally, if markets are very asymmetric, branding decisions depend almost exclusively on the pro…t impact on one single product. Consider a brand extension from a mass category to a niche category for example ( close to 0). Then, the performance of the new product matters mainly because of its feedback e¤ect on the old product. The old product's performance, on the other hand, is important mainly with respect to its impact on the belief about the old product itself.
Performances thus have two instead of four relevant e¤ects on pro…ts, which, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, does not su¢ ce to sustain a non-babbling equilibrium.
Hence, for non-babbling equilibria to exist, it is necessary that (i) the …rm puts su¢ cient weight on the pro…ts from selling both the old and the new product, (ii) the …rm puts su¢ cient weight on future pro…ts, (iii) consumers are relatively ill-informed about both products' qualities at the moment of the brand extension, and (iv) good products are su¢ ciently superior to bad products.
Positive quality correlation
In this section, I …rst discusses some general characteristics of equilibria with positive quality correlation ( > 0) and then provide conditions under which an equilibrium with perfect positive quality correlation exists.
In any equilibrium with positive quality correlation, umbrella branding must be pro…table if both products are of the same quality. Hence, the following two conditions must be met:
Intuitively, the condition (g; g) 0 is easy to satisfy. If > 0 in equilibrium, then feedback e¤ects have a positive expected long term impact for a …rm with two good products (see Lemma 1) . Hence, as long as the signaling e¤ects are not too adverse, umbrella branding is pro…table for a …rm with two good products.
It is more di¢ cult to induce a …rm with two bad products to umbrella brand: by Lemma 1, the expected total impact of the feedback e¤ects is negative for such a …rm. 
Intuitively, it seems di¢ cult to reconcile any one of these two conditions with (b; b) 0: failures have negative feedback e¤ects when > 0, and failures are most likely when both products are bad.
To explain why a …rm with products of di¤ering qualities may nevertheless have lower incentives to use umbrella brands than a …rm with two bad products, one needs to consider the sizes of these expected negative feedback e¤ects. To …x ideas, let me focus on candidate equilibria in which x gb < 1, which requires that (g; b) 0. In any such equilibrium, it must be that
This condition is equivalent to
The latter condition holds if and only if
Hence, given the new product is bad, umbrella branding must be less attractive relative to separate branding if the old product succeeds than if it fails. How is this possible, given that a success of the old product has a positive feedback e¤ect on the new product under umbrella branding? 21 If q n = b, then the new product is likely to fail, which induces a negative feedback e¤ect under umbrella cash ‡ow widens as brand strength increases". Interpreting brand strength as the initial reputation r o of the core product, this …nding is consistent with positive quality correlation: as can be easily checked, the signaling e¤ect on the new product, n r n , increases in r o in any equilibrium with > 0. 21 Any success (failure) also has a positive (negative) direct e¤ect on the product concerned itself. The branding decision can have an impact on the size, but not the sign, of this e¤ect. My discussion in the main text focuses on feedback e¤ects instead, since these are key to understanding endogenous quality correlation.
branding. The key point is that this negative feedback e¤ect from the new on the old product can be stronger if the old product succeeds than if it fails. If the old product's failure already gives consumers a strong indication of bad quality, then the new product's failure merely provides some additional evidence pointing into the same direction. If the old product succeeds, however, then the negative feedback e¤ect can severely damage the old product's reputation. Intuitively, this is the case if consumers expect a strong quality correlation and failures are strong indications of low quality while successes leave open the possibility that the product is bad. Separate branding can then be attractive for a mixed quality …rm because it allows the …rm to shelter the reputation of the good product.
The following proposition shows that for g su¢ ciently close to 1, there indeed always exists a non-empty set of values of the other parameters such that in equilibrium umbrella branding signals that products are of identical qualities:
Proposition 3 There exist thresholds r o (r n ; ) 2 (0; 1), b(r o ; r n ; ) 2 (0; 1), (r o ; r n ; ; b) 2 (0; 1) and (r o ; r n ; ; b) 2 ( ( ); 1) such that for g su¢ ciently close to 1, a (pure strategy) equilibrium with = 1 exists if i) r o is high enough so that, given the branding strategy (1; 0; 0; 1), the decision to umbrella brand increases short term pro…ts:
ii) quality di¤erences are su¢ ciently large: b 2 0; b(r o ; r n ; ) ; and iii) the …rm attaches su¢ cient weight to both present and future pro…ts:
(r o ; r n ; ; b) < < (r o ; r n ; ; b):
The condition that g is close to 1 ensures that failures are su¢ ciently strong indications of low quality. This implies that if the performances of two umbrella branded products di¤er, the negative 22 An alternative way to express 1 > 0 as a condition on the model parameters would be r n > r n (r o ; ) 2 (0; 1).
feedback e¤ect from the failure dominates the positive feedback e¤ect from the success. In the limit, for g equal to 1, consumers will always conclude that both products are bad. Therefore, 2 (F; S) and 2 (S; F ) are negative for large enough g. Moreover, two failures almost fully convince consumers that both products are bad, under umbrella as well as under separate branding. Hence, lim g!1 2 (F; F ) = 0. Condition ii) in Proposition 3 ensures that bad products fail with a high enough probability. This implies that …rms with products of di¤ering qualities are indeed very likely to experience one success and one failure, and will hence lose pro…ts in the long term by opting for an umbrella brand. For …rms with two bad products, on the other hand, two failures are su¢ ciently more likely, so that the long term e¤ect of umbrella branding is small. Condition i) guarantees that 1 > 0, which implies that for su¢ ciently low discount factors umbrella branding is pro…table for …rms with two bad products. 23 If both products are bad but the initial belief r o happens to be high enough due to luck in the past, it is optimal to umbrella brand to maximally exploit the brand's existing reputation in the short run. 24 However, for too low discount factors, 1 > 0 implies that umbrella branding would also be pro…table for …rms with products of di¤ering qualities; condition iii) is therefore needed to ensure that the discount factor lies in an intermediate range. Figure 1 illustrates pure strategy equilibria with perfect quality correlation.
Numerical example
It shows for which values of r o and b perfect correlation equilibria exist if g is almost equal to 1 (g = 0:99999999999999), r n = 0:4, and the di¤erent markets are symmetric, i.e., = any r o > 0:6, it is indeed optimal for the (g; g)-type to umbrella brand. This is intuitive. For g close to 1, two successes in the …rst period are almost certain if both products are good, and successes have positive feedback e¤ects under umbrella branding. As long as signaling e¤ects are not too negative, umbrella branding is therefore pro…table. 23 Some readers may feel a tension between condition i) of Proposition 3 and condition ii) of Proposition 2, which states that r o cannot be too close to 1. However, for any r o that satis…es condition i) of Proposition 3, there exists a set of the other parameter values, including some g su¢ ciently close to 1, such that perfect positive quality correlation is an equilibrium. At the same time, keeping all other parameters …xed a perfect quality correlation equilibrium can only exist if r o is not too close to 1. 24 There are numerous examples of …rms that after experiencing some initial success with one product (high enough r o in my model) pursued brand extensions but eventually failed in all markets. For instance, Excite@Home, once a leading cable internet provider, fell behind the competition and eventually went bankcrupt after extending its brand to several online media properties (Haig, 2003 Consider the indi¤erence curve de…ned by (b; b) = 0 now. If bad products are likely to fail, i.e., b is small, then the (b; b)-type is likely to experience two failures. Since lim g!1 2 (F; F ) = 0, umbrella branding is then pro…table for …rms with two bad products whenever 1 > 0. As b rises, it becomes more probable that one product will fail and one succeed, which renders umbrella branding less attractive. Unless r o is high enough so that a large 1 can o¤set this expected loss, 25 …rms with two bad products no longer want to umbrella brand. Finally, for su¢ ciently large b, umbrella branding is more pro…table again, since two successes become a likely scenario. Moreover, as b approaches g, failures induce less and less updating.
For …rms with one good and one bad product, on the other hand, umbrella branding is unpro…table if the bad product is likely to fail, i.e., b is small. As explained above, the negative feedback e¤ect of a failure of the bad product would lead to a pro…t loss in the second period. For small b, this second period e¤ect is so strong that even if umbrella branding increases pro…ts in the …rst period, it may still lower the total expected pro…ts for …rms with one good and one bad product. As b rises, umbrella branding becomes more and more pro…table for any given r o . Conversely, for any given b, umbrella branding is pro…table only if r o is su¢ ciently large. Equilibria with perfect correlation then exist for b and g in the shaded area that lies above the indi¤erence curve de…ned by (b; b) = 0 but below the lower envelope of the indi¤erence curves corresponding to (b; g) = 0 and (g; b) = 0.
The impossibility of negative quality correlation with umbrella branding
Whenever < 0, successes (failures) have negative (positive) feedback e¤ects. This is clearly counterintuitive, and the empirical and experimental evidence strongly indicates the opposite. It turns out that (unlike in some existing frameworks) there are no negative quality equilibria in pure strategies in my model: 26 Proposition 4 There does not exist any (pure strategy) equilibrium with umbrella branding in which
To understand the intuition behind this result, consider perfect negative correlation …rst. In that case, umbrella branding convinces consumers that one product is good and one product is bad, without them knowing which product is the good one. If the …rm chooses umbrella branding, the success of product i 6 = i 2 fo; ng then has a positive direct impact on consumers'belief about i's quality that is exactly equal to its negative feedback e¤ect on consumers'belief about product i.
Under separate branding, on the other hand, successes have positive direct e¤ects but no negative feedback e¤ects. This implies that a …rm with two bad products has a stronger incentive to umbrella brand than either a …rm with a good old and a bad new product and/or a …rm with a bad old and good new product. 27 In other words, umbrella branding is particularly attractive for …rms with two bad products, since (i) the outside option of separate branding is less attractive for the (b; b)-type than for any other type, and (ii) successes, which are more likely to be experienced by …rms with one good product, induce large negative feedback e¤ects under umbrella branding.
Firms with two bad products hence cannot be kept from umbrella branding. If x bb = 1, however, there does not exist any equilibrium such that < 0 either. The reason is that signaling e¤ects decrease in x bb , and it is impossible to o¤set this stigmatization of umbrella brands by means of a high x gg without violating negative quality correlation 26 To be more precise, the proof of Proposition 4 rules out all (pure or mixed strategy) equilibria with = 1 and pure strategy equilibria with 2 ( 1; 0). 27 The relative importance of the di¤erent products determines whether (b; b) > (g; b) or (b; b) > (b; g) or both. For = 1 2 , both inequalities hold.
Extensions
Investments in product quality
This section considers a model extension that endogenizes the qualities of new products. The key di¤erence with respect to the baseline model is that prior to product launch any …rm endowed with a new product, i.e., the multi-product …rm and every entrant, must decide whether to make a onetime investment to ensure that q n = g; absent the investment, q n = b. For each …rm, the cost c of the quality-improving investment is a random draw from the uniform distribution with support
, where the upper bound is chosen so as to equal the pro…t (and welfare) gain from the investment under symmetric information.
All …rms with new products observe their realization of c prior to the investment decision stage.
The multi-product incumbent makes the investment and branding decisions simultaneously. 28 Consumers observe neither the investment decision nor product qualities, but are aware of the probability distribution of the investment cost. A strategy for an entrant consists of an investment decision rule as a function of the realization of c. A strategy for the multi-product incumbent …rm consists of a rule determining both the investment and the umbrella branding decision as a function of c and q o .
In equilibrium, each …rm chooses a strategy that maximizes its expected pro…ts given beliefs, and beliefs are Bayesian consistent with the …rms'strategies. 29 My goal is to …nd out whether and how the investment incentives of a multi-product incumbent depend on q o , and how they compare to the incentives of an entrant. Since the investment cost is random, any set of strategies induces three investment probabilities: one for entrants, one for the multi-product …rm if q o = g, and one the multi-product …rm if q o = b. These probabilities will be denoted by i, i g , and i b , respectively. As before, perfect positive quality correlation means that gg ; bb > 0 while gb = bg = 0, where these beliefs now depend on the anticipated joint investment/branding decision of the multi-product …rm.
Proposition 5 Suppose an equilibrium in which umbrella branding signals perfect quality correlation exists. Then,
and 0 < i < 1 in this equilibrium.
Proposition 5 shows that in any equilibrium with perfect positive quality correlation having the option to use an umbrella brand a¤ects the optimal investment decision. In particular, the umbrella branding option introduces a tendency to align the new product's quality to that of the existing product. In fact, the inequalities in Proposition 5 are strict whenever the multi-product …rm has a strict preference for umbrella branding when both products are good and a strict preference for separate branding when both products are bad.
The intuition is straightforward. Given perfect quality correlation, a …rm with the option to umbrella brand faces the choice between (i) selecting quality q n = q o and umbrella branding, or (ii) q n 6 = q o and separate branding. Moreover, in equilibrium the branding decision has to be optimal given the (simultaneous) investment decision. 30 A …rm that can umbrella brand its new product with a good old product has a higher investment incentive than a single-product entrant because umbrella branding increases the value of the investment beyond what the entrant can expect. For a …rm with a bad old product, the situation is exactly the reverse: the option to umbrella brand, chosen only if the investment is not made, increases the expected relative value of having two bad products.
Given the existence result for equilibria with perfect quality correlation in the baseline model two products under an umbrella brand. 30 If, given the investment decision, …rms had an incentive to opt for a di¤erent branding decision ex post, then their (joint investment and branding) strategy would clearly not be optimal. 31 For these parameter values, there are no other pure strategy equilibria with feedback e¤ects.
The corresponding equilibrium investment probabilities are i g ' 0:68, i ' 0:37, and i b ' 0:35. In expectation, the …rm with the umbrella branding option invests more often than an entrant:
Fit between products
A central theme in the empirical and experimental marketing literature on branding is that the …t between the old and the new product is a predictor of how correlated consumers'quality beliefs are.
The better the …t between products in terms of product characteristics, the higher the likelihood that umbrella branding permits a …rm to leverage brand equity.
Formalizing this argument has proved di¢ cult, however. Sappington and Wernerfelt (1985) model …t in a somewhat ad hoc way by assuming that incongruent extensions create "image costs", but overall the theoretical literature has largely ignored the question. The goal of this section is to propose a simple extension of the baseline model that takes a …rst step towards integrating the notion of …t into an information-based theory of branding. The focus will be on …t on the production side, as captured by perceived similarities in manufacturing in the experimental literature (see Bottomley and Holden 2001).
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Suppose that with probability 1 k 2 [0; 1] the multi-product …rm is unable to observe the quality of the new product it is endowed with. In the baseline model, k = 1. For k < 1, the branding strategy is of the form (x gg ; x gb ; x bg ; x bb ; y g ; y b ), where y g (y b ) is the probability of a brand extension if the new product is of unknown quality and the old product is good (bad). In a Bayesian equilibrium, consumers must take into account the possibility that the multi-product …rm may not know quality.
For example, gg becomes k gg
It is straightforward to see that for k < 1 an equilibrium with perfect positive quality correlation, that is, of the form (1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0), is less likely to exist than for k = 1. In any perfect quality correlation equilibrium, it must be that (g; g) 0 but (g; b) 0. For k < 1, an additional constraint is that the …rm does not want to extend its brand to a new product of unknown quality.
The expected average pro…t impact of umbrella branding in the latter case, let me denote it by (g), 32 The other main dimensions of …t used in the literature are demand subsitutability and demand complementarity.
is a weighted average of (g; g) and (g; b). Since (g; g)
0, the equilibrium constraint that guarantees that products of unknown qualities are not sold under umbrella brands, i.e. (g) 0,
is at least as strict as the condition (g; b) 0. Similarly, since it must be that (b; b) 0, the condition (b) 0 is at least as strict as the condition (b; g) 0.
One interpretation of the parameter k is that it measures the relatedness or …t between the old and the new product. Sellers are less able to evaluate the quality of new products that are far from their core competencies. Consumers, upon observing the new product's category and hence …t, anticipate the probability k with which the seller knows the new product's quality. The above arguments then suggest that if the …t is bad (k < 1), an equilibrium with positive quality correlation is less likely to exist.
Concluding remarks
This paper shows that even if two products are unrelated from a technological point of view, the decision to sell them under the same brand name can credibly signal to consumers that the products' Another key …nding is that umbrella branding can lead to an hitherto unrecognized link between …rms'incentives to invest in the quality of new products and the qualities of their existing products.
Whenever umbrella branding signals positive quality correlation to consumers, the option to use an umbrella brand strengthens investment incentives for …rms that already sell a high quality product, but weakens investment incentives for …rms whose core product is of low quality.
My theory applies best to product categories where it is di¢ cult for consumers to assess quality, such as high-tech products, expert services (lawyers, consultants,...), or drugs and some food categories. Brands play an important role as carriers of information about quality in such markets.
In other product categories, such as fashion, a more important function of brands is probably that consumers can signal something about their type (income, taste, connoisseur knowledge) to others or to themselves by means of their brand choices. An umbrella brand can then be a pro…table way to exploit the value of a brand that enjoys such a function (Pepall and Richards 2002) .
Concerning future research, it seems very interesting, but di¢ cult, to analyze the size limits of umbrella brands. Theories in which umbrella brands are a guarantee of high quality (Wernerfelt 1988; Choi 1998; Peitz 2008, 2009 ) imply that …rms have nothing to lose from adding ever more high quality products to an umbrella brand. In a model as in this paper where consumers remain uncertain even after repeated consumption, on the other hand, including an additional product may be risky. If the failure of a small number of products in an umbrella brand is su¢ cient to convince consumers that all products are likely to be of low quality, i.e., if negative feedback e¤ects are stronger than positive feedback e¤ects, one would expect that at some point …rms would not want to add any more products to an umbrella brand, even if all products are of high quality.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let i 6 = i 2 fo; ng. First note that since prices are linear in beliefs,
As explained in section 3.1, i ( i ) is the probability consumers would assign to product i being good given only the following two pieces of information: …rst, the fact that product i is umbrella branded, and second, its performance i :
) is the probability consumers assign to product i being good given not only i and the observation of an umbrella brand but also i :
Since i 2 fS; F g, the following equality then directly follows from Bayes'rule:
As the belief that a product is good is a probability, any conditional probability assigned to a product's success must trivially lie between b and g. Therefore:
33
Now consider the case q i = g. Since g > Pr f i = S j i , umbrella brandingg, it is a straightforward implication of the equality in (15) that for any i 2 fS; F g: The total "expected feedback e¤ect" can be decomposed as follows:
The …nding in (17) directly implies that if quality correlation is positive, so that 
If quality correlation is negative on the other hand, so that
Conversely, (15) and (16) imply that for q i = b the inequalities in (18) and (19) are reversed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose (in negation) that there is an equilibrium in which only …rms with good old products extend their brands, i.e., x bg = x bb = 0; but x gg > 0 and/or x gb > 0. Since even good products can fail (i.e., g < 1), consumers then believe that the old product is good with probability 1 in both periods: 
which is independent of q o . Any di¤erence between (g; q n ) and (b; q n ) must hence be due to a pro…t di¤erence under separate branding. Since pro…ts under separate branding are always lower the higher the number of bad products, we get that for any q n 2 fb; gg:
This implies that x bg x gg and x bb x gb , which contradicts the initial assumption. The same line of reasoning rules out equilibria in which umbrella branding fully reveals that the new product is good. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: i) First consider the limit case = 0, in which the decision to umbrella brand is fully driven by its impact on the expected pro…ts made from selling the core product. This expected pro…t impact can be decomposed into two terms corresponding to the signaling e¤ect and the feedback e¤ects on the old product, respectively. Moreover, the sign of the signaling e¤ect is independent of qualities. The sign of the expected impact of the feedback e¤ect on the old product depends on the quality of the new product however: by Lemma 1, it is positive if and only if q n = g. Now consider any candidate equilibrium such that > 0. First, it is easy to see that the signaling e¤ect must be positive in any such equilibrium.
If it were negative, then for …rms with a bad new product umbrella branding would reduce pro…ts, since both signaling and feedback e¤ects would reduce expected pro…ts. If x gb = x bb = 0 however, then umbrella branding does not signal any quality correlation. Therefore suppose that the signaling e¤ect is positive. In that case, both signaling and feedback e¤ects increase expected pro…ts for …rms with a good new product.
This implies that x gg = x bg = 1 in any such equilibrium. For the signaling e¤ect to be indeed positive, it must then be that x gb > x bb . This leads to a contradiction of the initial assumption > 0, since -given that good new products are always umbrella branded -positive correlation would require that bad new products are more likely to be under an umbrella brand with other bad rather than good products.
Hence, for = 0, there does not exist any equilibrium such that > 0. Using the same approach, I can rule out all equilibria such that 6 = 0 for = 1 or = 0. Since pro…ts are smooth in , it follows from these results that equilibria with feedback e¤ects do not exist for "too" close to 0 or 1 either.
'Non-babbling'equilibria without feedback e¤ects are also impossible. In this case, whether …rms want to umbrella brand or not will only depend on the signaling e¤ect on one of the products, the sign of which is independent of qualities. iii) If the weight attached to future pro…ts approaches 0, then short term signaling e¤ects completely drive the …rm's decision to umbrella brand or not:
(q o ; q n ) = 1 .
In the limit, the incentives to umbrella brand are hence completely independent of qualities. By continuity, this implies that for su¢ ciently close to 0, only babbling equilibria can exist. 34 iv) If b were equal to g, then performance would no longer yield any information about quality to consumers. Formally, this would mean that for any initial belief , S ( ) = F ( ) = . Hence,
which is independent of (q o ; q n ). It then follows from continuity that for b su¢ ciently close to g, only 'babbling'equilibria can exist. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The proof will proceed as follows. First I show that in the limit case g = 1 (while all other parameters remain strictly between 0 and 1), a pure strategy equilibrium such that 34 Whenever 1 6 = 0, the umbrella branding incentives of the di¤erent …rm types are completely aligned for all below some strictly positive threshold. There may not exist any such strictly positive threshold of if 1 = 0 and one signaling e¤ect is strictly positive, however. This case is neglected here because generically it does not occur.
Moreover, since consumers expect umbrella brands to always sell products of uniform quality, the failure of a single umbrella branded product su¢ ces to convince consumers that both products are bad:
These observations imply that
The expected marginal impacts of umbrella branding on second period pro…ts are
An equilibrium with perfect quality correlation then exists if and only if the following four inequalities are satis…ed, so that the branding strategy (1; 0; 0; 1) is indeed optimal:
To show that conditions i) to iii) in Proposition 3 are su¢ cient to guarantee that (28) to (31) are indeed satis…ed for g = 1, the remainder of this proof will proceed as follows:
Step Step 2 There exists a threshold b(r o ; r n ; ) 2 (0; 1) such that
if b <b(r o ; r n ; ) and 1 > 0.
Step Step 1: Given the strategy (1; 0; 0; 1),
which can be rewritten as 35
The …rst of the terms in this expression is positive because > 0 implies that S > . The second term is positive if > (1 ) r o + r n , which is equivalent to 1 > 0 since = o = n . The third term is positive because S ( ) is a concave function. Hence, if 1 > 0 then 2 (S; S) > 0.
In the limit case g = 1, a …rm with two good products is certain to experience two successes. Hence,
35 The functional form of the willingness to pay function w implies that for any 1 and 2
which explains why the term (g b) appears in the denominator of (32) . The results of this paper would be the same for any other linear and increasing function w ( ), e.g., w ( ) = .
i.e., equilibrium condition (28) is satis…ed.
Given the strategy (1; 0; 0; 1), the condition 1 > 0 is equivalent to Step 2: I …rst show that there exists a threshold b b(r o ; r n ; ) 2 (0; 1) such that
Substituting for the expected pro…t di¤erences and simplifying, this condition rewrites as
which is equivalent to
It is easy to see that K(0) < 0. 
). Using (20) to (23) to substitute for lim g!1 2 (SS) to lim g!1 2 (F F ) in (27) and simplifying yields
which is strictly negative if and only if
Clearly, e K(0) < 0. Since e K(b) is a continuous function, this implies that there exists a e b(r o ; r n ; ) 2 (0; 1]
such that e K(b) < 0 if b < e b(r o ; r n ; ).
Hence, there exists a threshold
b <b(r o ; r n ; ) and 1 > 0.
Step 3:
Step 2 established that there exists a b(r o ; r n ; ) 2 (0; 1) such that max lim Moreover, for 2 (r o ; r n ; ; b); (r o ; r n ; ; b) , the three equilibrium conditions (29) , (30) and (31) are satis…ed with strict inequalities.
To conclude the proof note that, as long as r o ; r n ; b; 2 (0; 1), the equilibrium pro…ts from selling each of the products are smooth in g. 37 The statement in the proposition then directly follows from the results established in steps 1 to 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The …rst step is to show that there cannot be any equilibrium in which = 1, i.e., x gg = x bb = 0 but x gb ; x bg > 0. Such a strategy maximizes aggregate pro…ts if (b; g); (g; b) 0 but (g; g); (b; b) 0. Hence, the following two conditions must hold in any equilibrium with = 1:
Since the …rst period impact of umbrella branding is independent of (q o ; q n ), condition (39) is equivalent to
Condition (41) is indeed satis…ed, i.e., the (g; b)-type has higher incentives to umbrella brand than the (b; b)-type, if and only if, given q n = b, the expected second period advantage of umbrella branding over separate branding is greater when the old product succeeds rather than fails:
I now show that this condition is always violated if 1 2 . First, note that, since prices are linear in 36 It is obvious that the range of for which an equilibrium exists is always included in (0; 1) here: since is the share of pro…ts accruing to the second period, lim g!1 (q o ; q n ) can achieve any value between lim g!1 2 (q o ; q n ) and 1 by letting vary between 1 and 0. 37 If r o were equal to 1, for example, then beliefs may not be smooth: While for g = 1, it would not be clear what beliefs consumers should hold following a failure (of either one of the products), for g almost equal to 1, they would always continue to believe that both products are good (even after observing two failures).
beliefs, condition (42) :
Both in the case of a success or of a failure of the new product, which occur with probabilities b and (1 b)
respectively, the success of the old product has two di¤erent e¤ects under umbrella branding: …rst, a positive direct e¤ect on the belief consumers hold about the old product itself, and second, a negative feedback e¤ect on consumers'belief about the new product. Under separate branding, the success of the old product only has a positive direct e¤ect, whose size is independent of the new product's performance.
Next, note that in any equilibrium such that = 1 consumers must be convinced that the umbrella brand sells one bad and one good product. This means that for any realization of performances, the probability consumers assign to the new product being good must be the "complement" of the probability they assign to the old product being good. Formally, for any ( o ; n ):
From this it follows that (given the new product's performance) the positive (direct) e¤ect a success of the old product has on the old product itself is exactly o¤set by its negative (feedback) e¤ect on the new product: since for any n ,
it is always true that This condition is clearly violated for any 1 2 . First, if the …rm attaches the same or more weight to the pro…ts made on the new product, the negative feedback e¤ect of a success of the old product outweighs its positive direct e¤ect, hence the …rst two terms in (46) are negative. Second, successes always increase pro…ts under separate branding, so that the last term in (46) is negative for any .
Using the same line of reasoning, it is easy to show that for any 1 2 , …rms with a bad old and a good new product would prefer separate to umbrella branding, i.e., condition (40) would be violated. I can conclude that the necessary conditions (39) and (40) are never simultaneously satis…ed, and no equilibrium such that = 1 exists.
The next step is to show that there cannot be any negative quality correlation equilibrium in which x gg = 1. In that case, < 0 only if x bb < x gb x bg . It follows that both signaling e¤ects are positive: Using the same line of reasoning, it is easy to show that if < 0 and x bb = 1, then n F < r n .
Since < 0, it follows that also o S ; o < r o and n S ; n < r n . Therefore, 1 < 0 and 2 ( o ; n ) < 0 for any ( o ; n ), so that (q o ; q n ) < 0 for any (q o ; q n ), which contradicts < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Suppose that there exists at least one equilibrium that generates perfect positive quality correlation between umbrella branded products. In what follows, let me denote by U (q o ; q n ) and S (q o ; q n ), respectively, the multi-product …rm's expected aggregate pro…ts gross of investment costs under umbrella branding and under separate branding, given q o , and q n as determined by the investment decision. In line with previous notations, I use (q o ; q n ) = U (q o ; q n ) S (q o ; q n ). Note that in any equilibrium with perfect quality correlation, it must be that (g; g) ; (b; b) 0 and (g; b) ; (b; g) 0:
the branding decision must be optimal for any given investment decision, otherwise the …rm's strategy (that determines investment and branding jointly) could not be optimal in the …rst place.
Investing in high quality is pro…table for an entrant if and only if the expected increase in second-period pro…ts exceeds the investment cost, i.e., whenever c [w ( S (i)) w ( F (i))] :
Given the distributional assumptions, in equilibrium the following condition implicitly de…nes i : condition. Therefore, in any equilibrium with = 1, it must be that i 2 (0; 1). 38 Next consider a multi-product …rm with an old product of quality q o = g. In any equilibrium with perfect quality correlation, this …rm will either invest and umbrella brand, or alternatively not invest and Since for = 1 to arise it is necessary that (g; g) 0, we can conclude that i g i. Moreover, whenever (g; g) > 0 (as is the case in such equilibria for g close to 1), then i g > i.
Now consider a multi-product …rm whose old product is of quality q o = b. In any equilibrium with = 1, 
